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INTRODUCTION
International human trafficking and enslavement have been issues
throughout history. Today, human trafficking, specifically regarding trafficking
for sexual services, reaches at least 118 documented countries and is one of the
most profitable crimes globally.1 The majority of the roughly twenty-one million
trafficking victims worldwide are women and girls.2 These victims are frequently
induced into slavery through false pretenses, family members who sell them into
the trade, kidnapping, or debt bondage.3 Occasionally, victims voluntarily
integrate themselves into the sex trade, often while following the
recommendations of another prostitute or seeking a greater income. Although
victims are trafficked for various reasons including prostitution, domestic
servitude, manufacturing, and agriculture, the focus of this paper will be on
international human sex trafficking4 However, it must be understood that sex
trafficking constitutes only about twenty-five percent of the global human
trafficking network.5
There was no internationally accepted definition for “trafficking” until
2000, when the United Nations (UN) published a definition in Article 3 of the
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children (also known as the Palermo Protocol).6 Article 3 of this
Protocol clearly defines human trafficking as:
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons,
by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of
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vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the
purpose of exploitation.7
This definition is specific, yet it encompasses many aspects of trafficking,
including the act (recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of
persons), means (using threats, force, or coercion, abduction, fraud, deception,
abuse of power or vulnerability, giving or receiving payments or benefits), and
purpose (exploitation) of trafficking. This comprehensive wording labels a wide
range of people as traffickers and activities as trafficking; one would assume,
therefore, that the introduction of the Palermo Protocol’s encompassing definition
into international law would result in an increase in worldwide prosecutions for
such offenses, especially in countries that signed the Protocol and agreed to adopt
its definition. However, it appears that the Palermo Protocol’s wording for its
human trafficking definition reduces its global support and therefore its strength.
By 2012, 157 of the UN’s 192 members had ratified the Palermo Protocol; this
agreement bound them to adopt the Palermo definition of human trafficking and
construct the necessary legislation to criminalize such activities. However, many
Protocol-ratifying countries that self-report compliance are, in fact, not.8 Also, the
domestic sex trafficking laws of various countries contain definitions with
significant differences from the Protocol’s. Why has the Palermo Protocol been
ineffective and globally unenforced? This paper seeks to display that the Palermo
Protocol is ineffective due to disagreements on wording, inaccurate reporting, and
the UN's inability to enforce compliance.
THE BROAD WORDING OF THE PALERMO PROTOCOL
International disagreement regarding the broad wording of the Palermo
Protocol’s human trafficking definition has led Protocol signatory countries to
create their own definitions. These nations should either accept the Protocol’s
human trafficking definition or begin international discussion to modify the
definition to which they have agreed. “Destination” countries have an additional
obligation to adhere to international legislation and provide acceptable national
laws to protect victims of trafficking brought into their countries, especially
because these countries have the financial and legal means to do so.
One-hundred-forty-seven countries signed the Palermo Protocol, which
requires them, per Article 5, to uphold and enforce the Protocol’s trafficking
definition; yet many countries maintain definition variants within their own
national sex trafficking legislation. Of course, having a definition which deviates
7
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from that of the Protocol is not inherently incriminating. If a state has a broader
and more encompassing definition than the Protocol, it may be able to prosecute
and convict more traffickers than if it had simply adopted the Protocol’s
definition. This rarely occurs, however, as more states have definitions that are
narrower than the Protocol’s. This means that these states cannot prosecute or
convict as many traffickers as the Palermo Protocol definition would allow, thus
directly violating the Protocol.
LEGISLATION ISSUES
Compliance with and adaptation of the Palermo Protocol varies greatly
among Protocol signatory countries: some countries define trafficking more
broadly than the Protocol, and some have copied the Article 3 definition verbatim,
but a majority of the signatory nations have adopted human trafficking definitions
narrower than that of the Palermo Protocol, meaning that these countries reduce
the number of traffickers they can legally convict.9
Three main areas of dispute create differences among trafficking
definitions: whether the victim’s consent is relevant; whether the victim was
trafficked internationally or intranationally; and whether the victim received
compensation for sexual employment.
Although the victim’s consent is irrelevant according to the Palermo
Protocol, many countries still consider consent an important factor in determining
whether a person in a trafficking situation was actually trafficked. For example, if
a woman agrees to be housed in a brothel under repressive conditions in a foreign
country for the sole employment of sexual services, some countries would
consider her to not be a sex trafficking victim because she consented to participate
in such activities; however, the Palermo Protocol would disregard her consent.
Because the Palermo Protocol focuses on the act, method, and purpose of
trafficking, it ignores the victims and instead focuses on the traffickers. Thus, the
consent of the person being trafficked is irrelevant to the definition of trafficking
according to the Protocol. However, many countries, including the United States,
consider consent a vital part of the definition: if a person consents to being
trafficked, then the trafficker cannot be convicted.10
Another aspect that creates differing trafficking definitions is international
and intranational transportation. According to the Palermo Protocol, human
trafficking does not require crossing borders, and therefore intranational
trafficking is a legitimate, convictable crime. Some countries, however, consider
transnational passage a requirement in their trafficking definitions.11 This
9
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stipulation means that intranational sex trafficking is not a criminal offense, even
if the victim is transported within the country.
Finally, many countries require a lack of compensation for a service in
order for an act to be considered trafficking. However, the Palermo Protocol does
not differentiate between situations of compensation and noncompensation. These
definition differences create extra offenses that must be established by a
prosecutor in order to convict the criminal. For instance, the recruitment, capture,
and harboring of a person are not enough to convict someone for trafficking in
some countries, especially if the trafficking victim was compensated.12
Legislative differences between the Palermo Protocol trafficking
definition and the definitions of signatory countries are unacceptable. Per the
Palermo Protocol’s Article 5, each state that signs the Protocol must adopt the
Palermo definition of human trafficking and create legislation that ensures the
criminality of trafficking.13
Two researchers from Örebro Univeristy in Sweden, Katalin Kelemen and
Märta Johansson (2013), analyze the legislative differences of five Palermo
Protocol signatory states: Sweden, Italy, the United Kingdom, Hungary, and the
Netherlands.14 Even though these countries have agreed to adopt and enforce the
Protocol definition for human trafficking, discrepancies exist. For example,
Swedish law requires the existence of an undefined “power relationship,” which
does not appear in the Palermo definition and makes the conviction of accused
traffickers more difficult.15 In Italy, the human trafficking definition is similar to
the Protocol’s, except that the Italian definition does not include recruiting or
receiving persons, effectively ignoring part of the trafficking market. Other
countries in this study, such as the Netherlands and Hungary, are not yet entirely
compliant with the Palermo Protocol but have been improving their national antitrafficking legislation. A lack of full compliance accompanied by legislative
improvements toward compliance is an international trend as awareness of the
human trafficking problem is gradually increasing. Some countries have only
recently criminalized human trafficking and are still developing appropriate
enforcement strategies.16 For example, the Netherlands has continued to make
legislative improvements, most recently in 2009, and Hungary extended its
12
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trafficking legislation as recently as July 1, 2013. Sweden made substantial,
effective changes in 2004 and again in 2010 to include intranational trafficking as
well as all forms of international trafficking.17 The transition from previously
existing human trafficking legislation to laws compliant with the Palermo
Protocol is a slow process that will take time to fully develop. However, countries
are gradually creating laws that increasingly reflect the Protocol. This shows that
countries may simply need more time to organize their anti-trafficking legislation.
DESTINATION COUNTRY RESPONSIBILITIES
Unsurprisingly, many trafficked victims emigrate from underdeveloped
countries seeking economic prosperity in a wealthier country. Political or social
turmoil, population growth with an insufficient job market, and cultural bias
against women are factors that make a country likely to become a sex slave
supplier.18 Trafficked persons, therefore, travel from underdeveloped countries to
“destination” countries, which are states that attract trafficked victims and/or their
traffickers due to their wealth, opportunity for an improved life, and demand for
sex workers. A country can also become a destination country if there is a mass
migration movement from a neighboring country. For example, Israel increased in
popularity as a trafficking destination due to migration from the East to the West
after the Soviet Union collapsed.19
Although the United States is portrayed in media and culture as having an
enormous sex trade and being a popular destination country, the United States
contains less than one percent of the world’s sex trade. Therefore, the many other
countries that contain the international human sex trade must be scrutinized.
Countries that have legalized prostitution, such as Italy, and countries with recent,
rapid economic growth, such as Thailand, have a much larger issue with
trafficking than the United States does.20 Fortunately, some of these welldeveloped destination nations have the greatest legislative success against
trafficking, primarily because they have the financial resources to create effective
legislation.21 These countries have the obligation to construct effective laws
because they have the means to do so.
By contrast, impoverished countries that supply the trafficked victims may
lack the financial and legislative ability to create effective anti-trafficking laws.
Destination countries that lack financial stability may also have difficulty funding
the creation of and enforcing effective anti-trafficking legislation. It may be
17
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debated whether countries that lack the means to develop such laws should be
given grace, allowing them to have noncompliant legislation. However, these
countries can simply copy the Article 3 definition verbatim into their laws to
effectively maintain compliance; therefore, there is no excuse for countries to
have noncompliant anti-trafficking legislation.22
Additionally, destination countries should expand their focus from finding
trafficked victims to also prosecuting and convicting the traffickers and the male
clients who provide the demand for sex slaves. Participating in the sex trade
industry is currently a low-risk, high-reward endeavor. The low-risk atmosphere
is caused by a lack of community and healthcare-responder awareness of
trafficking warning signs, ineffective and unenforced anti-trafficking laws, and
uninvestigated and unprosecuted trafficking crimes. Without the threat of arrest or
conviction, there are no deterrents for trafficking propagators. For example, Israel
has a deterrence issue. Their lack of enforcement regarding anti-trafficking
legislation only encourages perpetrators to continue, while inappropriately light
sentences given for sex trafficking offenses do not motivate perpetrators to stop
such activities.23
Also, the human trafficking industry is a largely prosperous one, as
billions of dollars are earned annually by traffickers worldwide.24 One factor that
may drive trafficking profits up is the underground nature of the market. The
inconvenience of discretion and secrecy for traffickers can justify demands for
higher commercial sex prices, which patrons are willing to pay. Furthermore,
many traffickers may attempt to maximize their profits by reducing production
costs, which leads to further victim abuse due to a lack of basic needs.
ENFORCEMENT ISSUES
All 147 Palermo Protocol signatory countries have agreed, through Article
5, to enforce the Article 3 trafficking definition, outlined above. Many countries
that have different definitions from the Protocol falsely report compliance with
the international agreement.25 Of the countries that are compliant in writing, forty
percent have yet to enforce their anti-trafficking laws and make a single
conviction.26 The UN lacks enforcement power to guarantee that signatory nations
adopt the Article 3 definition, as the anarchic nature of our international system
makes enforcing compliance almost impossible. Additionally, the Protocol lacks
explicitly stated levels of punishment for trafficking or related crimes covered
22
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within the document.27 Although this is standard for international agreements as it
respects individual states’ sovereignty, equal enforcement across the globe
becomes a problem. Additionally, countries may misrepresent the prevalence of
their sex trade and anti-trafficking legislation to receive aid, as explained in the
next section, “Reporting Issues.”
Even countries that are mostly compliant with the Palermo Protocol and
have made steps toward such anti-trafficking legislation are not always effective
in their enforcement of the Protocol. This negligence nullifies any attempts
toward legislative compliance. For example, the United Kingdom (UK) and Israel
have not been particularly effective in attempts to eliminate, or even reduce,
human sex trafficking. The UK lacks a comprehensive law that holistically
addresses human sex trafficking, and instead has formed various legislative pieces
that, when compiled, address aspects of trafficking.28 When the UK made public
steps against sex trafficking, their national raids led to a mere twenty-two
prosecutions and only fifteen convictions. Israel has not yet criminalized
prostitution, and its anti-pimping legislation remains unenforced. During 2011,
Israel convicted only seven traffickers, an unreasonably low number considering
its large human trafficking market.29 In Laos, steps toward criminalization are not
being taken, and the government is actually moving backward as the Lao sex
trafficking business is becoming increasingly deregulated. Public entertainment
venues have subtly transitioned to places where remunerated sex can be
obtained.30 These states, and others, must take greater steps toward the
enforcement of anti-trafficking legislation and prosecution of human sex
trafficking in order to see a reduction in such activities.
REPORTING ISSUES
Even though international organizations (IOs) and individual governments
try to collect accurate data regarding the sex trade, as well as the legislation
against it, their reports are often filled with false and misleading information.
Some of these reports allow states to collect and self-report information regarding
anti-trafficking measures, which often yields falsified data. For example, the
United States has developed a tiered rating system to assess international antitrafficking actions and laws. Grading factors include the quantity and quality of
anti-trafficking legislation, compliance with the United States Trafficking Victims
Protections Act (TVPA), and whether the quantity of trafficking victims increased
27

Kelemen and Johansson, “Still Neglecting the Demand,” 278.
Mandel, “Out of Sight, Out of Mind,” 217.
29
Ibid., 220; 224-25.
30
Sverre Molland, “‘The Perfect Business’: Human Trafficking and Lao-Thai Cross-Border
Migration,” Development and Change 41, no. 5 (2010): 839.
28

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2015

7

Global Tides, Vol. 9 [2015], Art. 5

in the past year.31 Although foreign governments, IOs, and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) use this report, a primary issue with the data collected is
that countries can self-report it. Because the United States provides financial
incentives to countries that report active anti-trafficking legislation and activity,
countries that rely on U.S. aid have an incentive to falsify information.
Other factors outside of self-reporting may lead to incorrect data. Cultural
pressures, such as societies in which women hold extremely low positions, might
lead governments to ignore trafficking or prostitution problems. This obviously
leads to incorrect information regarding these countries’ trafficking markets.
Additionally, NGOs and IOs often find collecting accurate and current data about
human sex trafficking difficult because it is a black-market economy; therefore,
much of the market, as well as information about it, is hidden or muddled.32
The overlap of and state-by-state variations in the definitions and
applications of “migration,” “smuggling,” “trafficking,” and “slavery” also create
challenges for countries and NGOs that wish to fight human trafficking.33 For
example, the definition of sex trafficking in the United States combines
smuggling, where a migrant usually consents to being internationally transported,
and trafficking, where the victim is exploited for profit without consent.34
Because “migration” contains a voluntary component, NGOs, IOs, state
governments, and trafficking prosecutors must determine whether the accused
trafficker also illegally transported victims. Specifically, Sverre Molland (2010), a
researcher and anthropologist at Australian National Univeristy, focuses on the
cross-border human sex trafficking and migration between Thailand and Laos. He
discovered that, within this region, governments and nongovernment associations
are struggling to separate voluntary migration from trafficking. Primarily, this
confusion occurs because many women voluntarily migrate from Laos to
Thailand seeking more prosperous employment in the sex trade industry.35
Frequently, these women move their work across the border to avoid community
members or prevent their families from discovering their profession.36
In fact, some organizations that attempt to reduce and eradicate sex
trafficking actually propogate such activity. For example, UN peacekeepers
frequently hire prostitutes in their assigned crisis zones, obviously frustrating UN
efforts to eliminate sex trafficking.37

31
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Victims, themselves, often do not report their trafficking situation, even if
they are in a safe environment. This can be because they do not trust authorities or
aid workers to maintain their privacy and prevent them from being arrested for
prostitution or because they fear retaliation from their traffickers or imprisoners.38
Furthermore, dependence on their traffickers and fear of authorities (due to
potential deportation or judgment) can act as barriers to self-reporting by
trafficking victims.39
Even Yury Fedotov, the executive director of the United Nations Office on
Drug and Crime (UNODC), acknowledges the existing gaps in knowledge about
human trafficking. In the Preface to the UNODC 2012 Global Report on
Trafficking in Persons, Fedotov specifically asks states to assist the UNODC in
gathering complete and accurate data about traffickers and their victims so that
the UNODC can create effective policies and responses by criminal justice
systems.40
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Despite the problems and complaints regarding the Palermo Protocol, the
document itself is not necessarily a bad piece of legislation. It is comprehensive
and inclusive, and, if enforced, could show promising improvement in reducing or
preventing the global problem of human trafficking. The primary problems with
the Protocol are not, in fact, problems with the Protocol itself. Instead, the lack of
enforcement and compliance with the Protocol provide the primary reasons for its
failures.
Even though many issues exist regarding both the enforcement of and
compliance with the Palermo Protocol, actions can be taken by individual states to
increase the effectiveness of their fight against human sex trafficking. Rather than
merely signing the Palermo Protocol and then writing different domestic laws,
countries are obligated to voice dissent in order to improve the Protocol.41 Unless
countries voice their disagreement, changes will not be discussed to improve
international legislation. Proposed changes to the Palermo Protocol can be used to
rewrite it, but only if these concerns are voiced. Additionally, preemptively noting
which signatory countries deviate legislatively from the Protocol, and then
establishing a timeline to create and enforce the new laws, might aid in global
legislative consistency.

38
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One solution that has been proposed is to change the Palermo Protocol’s
focus. Currently, the Protocol primarily focuses on the criminalization of
trafficking acts. Instead, the Protocol should contain multiple foci that criminalize
not only the trafficking of persons but also the purchase of sexual favors. In this
manner, traffickers, pimps, and clients can be prosecuted and convicted
effectively. This will hopefully reduce the demand for commercial sex. Moreover,
the Protocol should include an element that provides support and assistance for
rescued sex slaves.42
In certain countries where prostitution is legal, such as Italy and Israel, the
criminalization of prostitution would deter women who otherwise voluntarily
bring themselves into the market from further promulgating prostitution.43
As mentioned above, the demand for sexual services fuels the market and
therefore the sex trafficking industry. Countries should create laws that ban the
purchase of sexual services from trafficking victims. If states already have such
legislation, then governments should enforce such laws to decrease the demand
for prostitutes.44 Of course, trying to prohibit the purchase of sex slaves, while
leaving other forms of prostitution available, is extremely difficult. Some clients
may be unaware that their prostitute is currently being held against her will, and
most are unaware whether the prostitute came to her present location through
migration or trafficking. For example, Finland criminalized purchasing sexual
acts from trafficked victims; however, purchasers and local police find it difficult
to determine which prostitutes are trafficking victims and which are not. One
absolute way to decrease the demand for trafficked victims is to make the
purchase of sexual services illegal, regardless of circumstance.45 This guarantees a
decrease in demand for trafficked sex slaves.
Many NGOs have accused certain governments of focusing on
prosecuting criminals for trafficking-related offenses rather than trafficking itself,
and contend that these governments do so because legislation for other crimes is
firmer. This incomplete prosecution results in lighter punishments for the
convict.46 Using alternative or additional crimes as a prosecution technique, due
to the difficulties of convicting someone under human trafficking legislation, has
not improved the trafficking situation or increased protection.47 In fact, such “easy
prosecution” reduces trafficking risks and, therefore, might increase the human
sex trade. Instead of merely prosecuting sex traffickers based on traffickingrelated offenses, such as illegally smuggling foreigners into the country or
42
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abusing human rights of women in brothels or prostitution houses, prosecutors
should try to convict the perpetrators for the trafficking offenses themselves. If
the anti-trafficking laws of a country make such convictions a barrier to justice,
then prosecutors must speak up in order to influence legislative change. However,
transit countries (states that are neither destinations nor suppliers, but rather a
human trafficking thru-way) should receive grace for convicting traffickers for
trafficking-related crimes. Often, these governments have trouble sentencing
traffickers because trafficking and exploitation have not yet taken place, so they
can only convict the trafficker for applicable crimes, such as smuggling.
CONCLUSION
This paper has demonstrated that the Palermo Protocol is ineffective in
reducing global human sex trafficking due to disagreements on wording,
inaccurate reporting, and the UN’s inability to enforce compliance from Protocol
signatories. Many countries have definitions differing from the Palermo Protocol
regarding victim consent, transport, and compensation. However, all countries
that have signed the Protocol are obligated to adopt the Article 3 human
trafficking definition, per Article 5. Even though some countries have adopted
broader trafficking definitions than that of the Protocol, which allows for greater
prosecution of traffickers, most countries have developed narrower definitions
that instead reduce the number of trafficking convictions. These countries are not
sanctioned for lacking Protocol-compliant definitions of human trafficking
because cooperation is unenforceable. Additionally, many countries that do not
have compliant definitions for human trafficking actually report full compliance
to NGOs, IOs, and governments collecting data for analysis. This may be due to
financial or cultural pressures that motivate certain administrations to hide their
lack of anti-trafficking legislation and exaggerate their number of traffickingrelated convictions.
It is worth noting that the regulation of the prostitution market and
industry within a country is strongly connected to state sovereignty. Because of
this, states can create their own criminal legislation.48 This international standard,
although understandable, hurts attempts to standardize global legislation against
prostitution and trafficking. In addition, some countries are worried that entirely
criminalizing the sex industry, including voluntary prostitution, would drive the
market even further underground, making it even harder to regulate and control.49
Therefore, because prostitution-related legislation is in the control of individual
states, no international body can force countries to criminalize prostitution.
48
49
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Clearly, the Palermo Protocol has been unsuccessful in creating a unified,
internationally-recognized trafficking definition that is enforced by its signatories.
Reliable data should be collected by IOs, NGOs, and governments to better fight
the global human sex trade. In order for these organizations to collect dependable
statistics, countries that have signed the Protocol are obligated to voice concern
regarding the human trafficking definition so that improvements can increase the
Protocol’s effectiveness. Furthermore, educating businesses and the public will
help people better identify trafficking victims and situations so they can actively
participate in reducing the global sex trade. Additionally, countries should focus
on legislation that both criminalizes prostitution to reduce the supply of sex
industry participants, and incriminates traffickers and clients to reduce the
demand for such services. Ultimately, the enforcement of anti-trafficking
legislation is crucial to the reduction of the human sex trafficking market.
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